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Abstract. It is shown that simple and coalitional strategy-proofness of an aggrega-
tion rule on any rich weakly unimodal domain of a convex idempotent interval space
are equivalent properties if that space satises interval anti-exchange, a basic property
also shared by a large class of convex geometries including -but not reducing to- trees
and Euclidean convex spaces. Therefore, strategy-proof location problems in a vast
class of networks fall under the scope of that proposition.
It is also established that a much weaker minimal anti-exchange property is neces-
sary to ensure equivalence of simple and coalitional strategy-proofness in that setting.
An immediate corollary to that result is that such equivalence fails to hold both in
certan median interval spaces including those induced by bounded distributive lattices
that are not chains, and in certain non-median interval spaces including those induced
by partial cubes that are not trees.
Thus, it turns out that anti-exchange properties of the relevant interval space pro-
vide a powerful general common principle that explains the varying relationship be-
tween simple and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules for rich weakly
unimodal domains across di¤erent interval spaces, both median and non-median.
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1. Introduction
Establishing under what circumstances a strategy-proof aggregation rule or decision
mechanism is also coalitionally strategy-proof is a largely open issue of considerable
interest that has in fact attracted some attention in the recent literature. In particular,
Le Breton, Zaporozhets (2009) and Barberà, Berga, Moreno (2010) provide some quite
interesting but very restrictive purely set-theoretic properties that ensure equivalence of
strategy-proofness and coalitional strategy-proofness of social choice functions without
making any reference whatsoever to the outcome space structure. The present paper
will follow an entirely di¤erent route, focusing on a specic if vast class of outcome
spaces sharing a certain geometric structure and on a strictly related class of large
single peaked preference domains which rely precisely on that specic structure.
In that connection single peaked1 domains are of special interest because it is well-
known that on those domains and for certain outcome spaces where a median operation
is well-dened, there exist non-dictatorial and non-constant median-based strategy-
proof aggregation rules -including simple majority which is indeed the only anonymous,
neutral and unanimity-respecting rule among them. Moreover, and more to the point,
it is also known that in some of those single peaked domains all the strategy-proof
aggregation rules are coalitionally strategy-proof as well (see e.g. Moulin (1980), Danilov
(1994)) while in other cases they are not, and the simple majority -or extended median-
rule itself is not coalitionally strategy-proof (see e.g. Nehring, Puppe (2007 (a),(b)),
Savaglio, Vannucci (2014)).
What are then the factors of success for that particular class of robust mechanism
design problems? It is crystal clear that existence of a well-dened median rule on
the outcome space and restriction to a single peaked domain are key to ensure success.
However, in view of the results mentioned above, this cannot be the whole story.
Clearly enough, some further properties of the outcome space must play a role, but
which ones and in what combinations with the other requirements?
The present paper will show that entering explicit incidence-geometric considerations
can contribute a considerable clarication to that matter, and provide some (partial)
answers to the foregoing questions. Let us then briey outline the approach to be
proposed here.
To begin with, we start from a very general notion of single peakedness we label weak
unimodality: a weakly unimodal domain embodies two basic requirements for each
admissible preference: (i) existence of a unique top outcome and (ii) consistency with
a shared notion of compromise between every pair of outcomes comprising the top
outcome (namely, a true compromisebetween two such outcomes is never regarded
1In the present paper single peakedness is used as a comprehensive non-technical term which is
amenable to several specications including weak unimodality, unimodality and locally strict unimodal-
ity as dened in the text below.
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by a voter as worse than both of its extrema2). Thus, a total preorder on a certain
interval space is weakly unimodal if it has a unique topa and is such that for any b; c
of the underlying space, if c lies betweenthe topa and b then its lower contour must
include b.
Furthermore a domain of weakly unimodal total preorders is rich if for each pair of
outcomes a; b there exists a weakly unimodal total preorder of that domain having a as
its top, and whose upper contour at b is precisely the interval of a and b.
In particular, the full weakly unimodal domain is the rich domain consisting of all
weakly unimodal preferences of the required type (e.g. total preorders, or linear orders).
Arguably, the most tting environment to introduce the general notion of compro-
miserequired by unimodality is perhaps provided by interval spaces. An interval space
is a set X endowed with a suitable interval function I : X2 ! P(X) mapping each
pair of points of X into a subset of X denoting their (closed) intervalnamely the set
of points located betweenthem (see e.g. Sholander (1952, 1954), Mulder (1980), van
de Vel (1993), Coppel (1998)). Then, the available compromises between two outcomes
a; b consist precisely of the outcomes that belong to the interval of a and b. There-
fore, we shall henceforth identify the interval space with the compromise-structure of
the outcome space which agents have been able to agree upon.
The present paper addresses the issue of equivalence between simple and coalitional
strategy-proofness of aggregation rules on rich weakly unimodal domains in a general
setting of minimally regular interval spaces, namely convex and idempotent interval
spaces (an interval space is denoted here convex if its intervals are convex in the
obvious sense, and idempotentif the degenerate interval between one point and itself
reduces precisely to that point).
A su¢ cient condition for equivalence on any rich weakly unimodal domain (Theorem
1 below) is provided : it is shown that such equivalence holds whenever the interval
space satises a certain Interval Anti-Exchangeproperty. Interval Anti-Exchange is a
basic incidence-geometric property that is satised by standard Euclidean convex sets,
and is shared by all trees3.
The argument goes as follows:
2The subclass of unimodal domains obtain if requirement (ii) is extended to every ordered pair of
outcomes. The alternative subclass of locally strictly unimodal domains (also sometimes labeled gen-
eralized single peakedin the extant literature) obtain by further requiring the compromiseoutcome
to be strictly better than the non-top outcome among its extrema. Unimodal and locally strictly
unimodal domains are by far the more widely studied single peaked domains. One of the very few
extensive studies of a weakly unimodal domain I am aware of is given in Berga (2002) where the
underlying outcome space is a nite product of real bounded chains with the L1 or rectilinear metric.
3It is easily checked that Interval Anti-Exchange is indeed independent of minimal regularityof
an interval space as dened above (see Coppel (1998) for a thorough discussion of the role of that
property in convex geometry as a key property of the important subclass of so-called linear geometries
that include Euclidean convex sets and trees).
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(a) strategy-proofness of an aggregation rule f on a rich weakly unimodal domain
in a convex idempotent interval space plus Interval Anti-Exchange of that space jointly
imply that two arbitrary proles xN ,yN of voters choices result in distinct outcomes
u = f(xN), v = f(yN) only if there exists at least one agent i among those that choose
di¤erently at xN and yN such that u is a compromise between v and her choice xi at
xN ;
but then,
(b) if xi is the top outcome of agent i, weak unimodality implies that v cannot be
strictly better than u for agent i, hence coalitional strategy-proofness of f follows.
One signicant implication of that result for location problems in networks is quite
clear: whenever the network is a tree or indeed any graph whose interval function is
convex, idempotent and satises Interval Anti-Exchange, any strategy-proof aggregation
rule for any corresponding rich weakly unimodal domain is also coalitionally strategy-
proof on that domain.
A much weaker Minimal Anti-Exchange property is also shown to be a necessary
condition for equivalence of simple and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules
on rich weakly unimodal domains (see Theorem 2 below).
It follows that, as a consequence, equivalence fails to hold in any median interval space
induced by a bounded distributive lattice (or indeed by a bounded median graph) that
is not a chain.
Such an equivalence failure is established by proving the existence of a non-trivial
non-dictatorial strategy-proof aggregation rule on the relevant rich weakly unimodal
domain that admits at least four distinct outcomes in its range and is not immune from
coalitional manipulations. In that connection, it should also be emphasized that since
constant and dictatorial rules are obviously coalitionally strategy-proof, it follows that
-from a mechanism-design perspective- equivalence failure on a certain weakly unimodal
domain has also some positive, constructive implications because it implies the existence
of non-trivial non-dictatorial strategy-proof aggregation rules on that domain.
Summing up, the main contributions of the present paper may be described as follows.
First, the characterization via interval-monotonicity of strategy-proof voting rules for
the full unimodal domain of linear orders on the interval space of a tree due to Danilov
(1994) is extended to any rich weakly unimodal domain of total preorders in an arbitrary
convex interval space.
Second, it is shown that for any minimally regular interval space Interval Anti-
Exchange is su¢ cient to ensure equivalence of simple and coalitional strategy-proofness
of aggregation rules on the corresponding rich weakly unimodal domain, both for median4
and non-median interval spaces.
4An interval space is said to be median if for any three points a; b; c, the intervals of their three
pairs have precisely one point in common (their median). Notice that a convex idempotent interval
space may or may not be median, but it is well-known that a median interval space is both convex
and idempotent: see e.g. Mulder (1980).
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Third, a considerably weaker anti-exchange property calledMinimal Anti-Exchange is
shown to be necessary to ensure equivalence of simple and coalitional strategy-proofness
of aggregation rules on the corresponding rich weakly unimodal domain: thus, viola-
tion of Minimal Anti-Exchange explains equivalence failure for simple and coalitional
strategy-proofness of aggregation rules on rich weakly unimodal domains in certain out-
come spaces both median and non-median such as (the interval spaces of) distributive
lattices and partial cubes (that are not trees) as dened below, respectively.
Finally, the implications of the two foregoing results for full weakly unimodal equiv-
alence in several interval spaces arising from outcome sets of special interest listed in
Section 2 are pointed out (and collected under Corollary 2 below). Several known
equivalence and inequivalence results and a few new ones are given a common geomet-
ric foundation. The former include bounded chains and trees (equivalence), cliques
(trivial i.e. impossibility induced equivalence), bounded distributive lattices other
than chains (inequivalence). The latter include Euclidean convex sets, duallearning
spaces, networks consisting of joins of cliques (namely, complete graphs) and chains
(equivalence), and the permutahedroni.e. the network induced by linear orders on a
nite set and their elementary permutations (inequivalence).
Apparently, an explicit consideration of incidence-geometric properties of the under-
lying outcome space o¤ers a distinctive insight on the reasons underlying the respective
success and failure of coalitional strategy-proofness of nice median-based aggregation
rules for rich weakly unimodal domains in bounded chains and trees, and in bounded
distributive lattices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a list of
unimodal domains of some interest, including both extensively studied and largely
unexplored examples; Section 3 introduces the formal framework of the paper and
presents its main results; Section 4 includes a discussion of related literature; Section 5
o¤ers some short concluding remarks; all the proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2. Simple and coalitional strategy-proofness on rich weakly unimodal
domains: equivalent properties or not?
This section is devoted to a detailed description of a few remarkable examples of
outcome spaces that are covered by the results of the present paper.
As mentioned above, the simple-coalitional strategy-proofness equivalence issue for
some rich weakly unimodal domains has been partially explored in some specic classes
of outcome spaces, including some median interval spaces (recall that median interval
spaces are those interval spaces such that the intervals of any three points have precisely
one point in common, their median).
Indeed, some facts about equivalence of simple and coalitional strategy-proofness (or
its failure) on full unimodal domains in some specic median interval spaces are well-
known. That is largely due to the circumstance that the structure of strategy-proof
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aggregation rules in those spaces is now well understood: in fact, it has been estab-
lished that strategy-proof aggregation rules on unimodal domains in median interval
spaces can be represented by iterated medians of projections (i.e. dictatorial rules) and
constants (see e.g. Moulin (1980), Danilov (1994), Savaglio, Vannucci (2014)). Let us
then start with a quick review of the best known classes of examples:
The outcome space is a bounded chain
If (X; I(6)) is the median interval space canonically induced by a bounded chain
(X;) with I(6)(x; y) = fz 2 X : x  z  y or y  z  x g for all x; y 2 X, then the
equivalence-issue is settled by the pioneering work of Moulin (1980), showing that (i)
the strategy-proof rules for the full unimodal domain on (X; I(6)) are precisely those
which can be represented as certain min-max lattice-polynomials , and (ii) all such
strategy-proof rules are also coalitionally strategy-proof on the same domain. Thus,
simple strategy-proofness and coalitional strategy-proofness are equivalent properties
here. In particular, the simple majority rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.
The outcome space is a nite tree
If (X; I) is the median interval space canonically induced by a nite tree G = (X;E)
(i.e. a nite connected graph without cycles) 5- namely I = IG with
IG(x; y) = fz 2 X : z lies on the unique shortest path joining x and yg
for all x; y 2 X-
the equivalence-issue is also settled by Danilov (1994), showing that (i) the strategy-
proof rules for the full unimodal domain of linear orders on (X; I) are precisely those
which can be represented as iterated medians of projections (i.e. dictatorial rules) and
constants, and (ii) all such strategy-proof rules are also coalitionally strategy-proof on
the same domain. Thus, simple strategy-proofness and coalitional strategy-proofness
are equivalent properties for full weakly unimodal domains in nite trees. In particular,
the extended median (or simple majority) rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.
5For any graph (or network) G = (X;E) with vertex set X and edge set E  ffx; yg : x; y 2 Xg the
interval space I =(X; IG) canonically induced by G is determined by dening the distance dG(x; y)
of any outcomes/vertices x; y as the length of the geodesics or shortest paths connecting them, and
including in the interval of two arbitrary outcomes or vertices x; y all the outcomes/vertices lying on
one of such geodesics. Thus, for any x; y 2 X :
IG(x; y) =

z 2 X : dG(x; y) = dG(x; z) + dG(z; y)	.
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The outcome space is a complete graph or clique
If I = (X; IG) is the (non-median) interval space canonically induced by a complete
graph or clique (namely a graph G = (X;E) with E = ffx; yg : x; y 2 Xg) -hence
IG(x; y) = fx; yg for all x; y 2 X-
then the full weakly unimodal domain of total preorders on (X; I) amounts to the
domain of all total preorders onX with a unique maximum. Therefore, the restriction of
the so-called universal domainto proles of total preorders with a unique maximum
may be regarded as the full weakly unimodal domain over an outcome space without
a shared nonempty compromise-structure. In particular, if jXj  3, it follows from
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (see e.g. Danilov, Sotskov (2002)) that dictatorial
rules are the only strategy-proof aggregation rules for the full unimodal domain on
(X; IG) which admit at least three distinct outcomes in their range. Moreover, it can
also be shown that if #X  3 there are no strategy-proof aggregation rules f : XN !
X having precisely two distinct outcomes (on this point, see the discussion following
Corollary 2 below). Hence constant rules and dictatorial rules are the only strategy-
proof aggregation rules on the full weakly unimodal domain of such (X; IG). Since both
constant and dictatorial rules are clearly coalitionally strategy-proof, it also follows that
simple and coalitional strategy-proofness are equivalent properties here: the equivalence
issue is quite easily and trivially settled for that domain.
The outcome space is a bounded distributive lattice
If I =(X; Im) is the (median) interval space canonically induced by an arbitrary
bounded distributive lattice X = (X;6; 0; 1) that is not a chain ( as dened by the
rule Im(x; y) = fz : x ^ y 6 z 6 x _ yg, where ^ and _ denote the 6-induced g.l.b.
and l.u.b. operations6), the equivalence-issue is also already settled in the negative by
Savaglio,Vannucci (2012) showing that (i) the strategy-proof rules for any rich weakly
unimodal domain on (X; Im) are precisely those which can be represented by certain
equivalent classes of max-min and min-max lattice-polynomials or as iterated medians
of projections (i.e. dictatorial rules) and constants, and (ii) if (X;6; 0; 1) is a bounded
distributive lattice but is not a chain, then there are strategy-proof voting rules on that
domain that are not coalitionally strategy-proof.7
In particular, simple strategy-proofness and coalitional strategy-proofness are not
equivalent properties for full weakly unimodal domains in the class of all median
6Note that Im = I(6) whenever (X;6) is a chain. Another important subclass of (X; Im) spaces
obtain by taking X to be a nite product of bounded real chains as endowed with the rectlinearor
taxicabmetric L1 and with corresponding interval function I canonically induced by geodesics i.e.
shortest paths (that is precisely the case studied by Barberà, Gul, Stacchetti (1993) with reference
to the full locally strictly unimodal domain, and by Berga (2002) with reference to the full weakly
unimodal domain).
7Nehring, Puppe (2007 (a),(b)) do not address the equivalence-issue as such, but include results
implying failure of coalitional strategy-proofness of the extended median rule on the domain of locally
strictly unimodal linear orders in Boolean k-hypercubes 2k with k  3.
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interval spaces induced by some arbitrary bounded distributive lattice, or by some
arbitrary median graphs. Moreover, it can be shown that the simple majority rule
retains its strategy-proofness on such domains but may be not coalitionally strategy-
proof. To check the last point, consider for instance the following example (see Bandelt,
Barthélemy (1984) and Nehring, Puppe (2007 (b)) for similar examples on the Boolean
cube) . Take the interval space induced by the Boolean square 22 = (22;6) where
6= f(0; 1); (x1; 1); (x2; 1); (1; 1); (0; x1); (0; x2); (0; 0); (x1; x1); (x2; x2)g
(we also posit for convenience of notation 1 = (1; 1), 0 = (0; 0), x1 = (1; 0), x2 =
(0; 1).
Notice that such a (median) interval space I =(22; Im) canonically induced by the
Boolean square 22 is dened as follows:
Im(1; 0) = Im(x1; x2) = f1; x1; x2; 0g and Im(x; y) = fx; yg otherwise.
Let N = f1; 2; 3g and consider I-unimodal and locally strictly I-unimodal preference
proles
(<1;<2;<3); (<01;<02;<03); dened respectively as follows:
x1 1 1 1 x2 1 0 , x2 2 1 2 x1 2 0, 0 3 x1 3 x2 3 1,
x1 01 1 01 x2 01 0 , x2 02 1 02 x1 02 0, 0 03 x1 03 x2 03 1:
Now, it is immediately checked that the median of the top outcomes of both preference
proles is (x1; x2; 0) = 0 because Im(x1; x2) \ Im(x2; 0) \ Im(x1; 0) = f0g. However,
observe that e.g. (1; 1; z) = 1 for any z 2 22. It follows that the median rule  is in
fact manipulable by coalition f1; 2g, hence it is clearly not coalitionally strategy-proof.
Let us now move on to a few interesting classes of networks/interval spaces where
-to the best of the authors knowledge- very little is known about the structure of
strategy-proof aggregation rules on the corresponding rich weakly unimodal domains.
To begin with, let us consider the class of (convex, idempotent) interval spaces as
resulting from the following important class of outcome spaces.
The outcome space is a simplex in an Euclidean convex space
In that case I =(X; IE) is the (convex, idempotent) interval space canonically in-
duced by the standard closed m-simplex in an Euclidean convex space, namely X =
x 2 Rm+1+ :
Pm
i=0 xi = 1
	
, and for all x; y 2 X,
IE(x; y) = fz 2 X : z = x+ (1  )y for some  2 [0; 1]g.
That is clearly not a median interval space if m  2: in fact, any nondegenerate
triangle in X fails to admit a median as dened above. Thus, in particular, the simple
majority rule (i.e. the extended n-ary median rule with n odd) is only available for
m = 1. Some work has been devoted to the study of simple and coalitional strategy-
proofness of aggregation rules on the domain of all a¢ ne total preference preorders
on (X; IE) (see e.g. Danilov, Sotskov (2002)), and of Euclidean preferences with a
bliss pointon (X; IE) (see Peters, van der Stael, Storcken (1992)). Notice that -for
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each agent- the latter Euclidean preferences may be construed as a subclass of locally
strictly unimodal total preorders as dened in Note 1 above.8 However, very little is
apparently known about the class of all strategy-proof aggregation rules for rich weakly
unimodal domains on (X; IE), or the existence of non-trivial non-dictatorial strategy-
proof aggregation rules on such domains. Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 of the present
paper will settle in the negative the latter issue.
The outcome space is a partially ordered set.
Let (X;6) be a partially ordered set (or poset), and I =(X; I(6)) the interval space
canonically induced by (X;6), namely
I(6)(x; y) = fx; yg [ fz 2 X : x 6 z 6 y or y 6 z 6 xg for all x; y 2 X.
Ordered sets are a pervasive structure and interval spaces of that kind encompass a
massive collection of cases. The following example concerning (dual) learning spaces
is worth mentioning (see e.g. Eppstein, Falmagne, Ovchinnikov (2008)). Consider a
nite set Y of competences/tasks, and a set K  P(Y ) (with ?; X 2 K) denoting
(missing) knowledge states as represented through the missing competences such that
for any A;B 2 K, A  B :
(i) there exist x1; :::; xm 2 X, and a chain Ci 2 K, i = 0; 1; :::;m with B = C0 
C1  :::  Cm = A such that Ci = Ci 1 r fxig, i = 1; :::;m denoting an admissible
learning process as generated by adding competences one by one in a suitably feasible
sequence9;
(ii) if x 2 A and B r fxg 2 K then A r fxg 2 K (namely if competence x may be
achieved starting from less advanced knowledge state B it may also be achieved starting
from more advanced knowledge state A).
In that case the voting problem concerns choice of a target knowledge state: the
relevant poset is (K;) hence I =(K; I()).
Very little is known about the nature of strategy-proof aggregation rules for rich
weakly unimodal domains on (X; I(6)), but the results of the present paper will enable
us to predict that all of them -including of course (K; I())- are also coalitionally
strategy-proof.
The next class of networks is also of considerable interest as models of location
problems in a large collection of abstract spaces:
8Namely , x  y if d(top(<); x) < d(top(<); y) where d denotes the Euclidean metric. Notice
however that the corresponding interval spaces are agent-dependent. It follows that preferences of that
sort cannot be construed as single peakedin the usual sense, which requires a shared compromise-
structureon the outcome space.
9That sequence is an instance of a shelling processi.e. decomposition of a structure by repeated
elimination of some suitable elements.
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The outcome space is a partial cube
Let I =(X; IG) the interval space induced by a partial cube, namely a graph G =
(X;E) which an isometric subgraph 10 of a nite cube 11. A remarkable example of that
case obtains when the vertices of the given partial cube denote the linear orders on a
nite set of cardinality m, which is precisely the relevant outcome space in strategy-
proof preference aggregation problems when preferences are linear orders on a nite
set (strategy-proof preference aggregation in a similar setting has been recently inves-
tigated by Bossert, Sprumont (2014)).12 The partial cube having such linear orders as
vertices -which is also denoted as the m-permutahedron(see e.g. Eppstein, Falmagne,
Ovchinnikov (2008))- is easily shown to be not a tree for m  3.
Thus, the foregoing list includes examples of outcome spaces where the status of avail-
able information on the issue concerning equivalence of simple and coalitional strategy-
proofness of aggregation rules for rich weakly unimodal domains is quite diverse. In a
few of them, the weakly unimodalequivalence-issue has been addressed and settled,
at least for certain full single peaked domains (either a¢ rmatively, for bounded chains,
nite trees and complete graphs, or negatively, for bounded distributive lattices - and
bounded median graphs - that are not chains). In other cases (e.g. Euclidean sim-
plexes, partial cubes) no general results on the existence of non-trivial non-dictatorial
strategy-proof aggregation rules for the full unimodal or weakly unimodal domains are
available in earlier works.
It is therefore quite remarkable that the main results of the present paper ( i.e. The-
orems 1 and 2) jointly address and settle at once such weakly unimodalequivalence-
issue in all of the outcome spaces considered above (and several others).
Let us then eventually turn to the formal setting and the ensuing analysis.
3. Strategy-proofness and anti-exchange properties: model and
results
Let N = f1; ::; ng denote the nite population of agents (with cardinality jN j = n),
X an arbitrary nonempty set of alternative outcomes, and I = (X; I) the interval
space of X , namely I : X2 ! P(X) is an interval function on X i.e. it satises the
following conditions:
10A graph G0 = (Y;E0) is an isometric subgraph of graph G = (X;E) if Y  X, the edge set E0
is the restriction of edge set E to pairs of vertices in Y , and the length of the shortest paths between
any two vertices in Y is the same in G and G0.
11A nite cube on a nite set U is the graph having as vertices the subsets of U , with edges
connecting any two subsets whose characteristic functions di¤er by just one value.
12The Bossert-Sprumont setting is just similarto the one mentioned in the text in that the ag-
gregatedpreference relations of a prole of linear orders are allowed to be non-antisymmetric total
preorders. That approach amounts to an aggregation problem with a restricted domain.
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I-(i) (Extension): fx; yg  I(x; y) for all x; y 2 X,
I-(ii) (Symmetry): I(x; y) = I(y; x) for all x; y 2 X.
Notice that for any Y  X, an interval space I = (X; I) induces a natural interval
space on Y , namely its interval subspace IY = (Y; IY ) where IY denotes the restriction
of I to Y 2.
In particular, we also assume n  2 in order to avoid tedious qualications, and will
be mostly concerned with idempotent interval spaces i.e. with interval spaces whose
interval function also satisfy the following conditions, namely
(Idempotence): I(x; x) = fxg for all x 2 X.
(Convexity): I(u; v)  I(x; y) for all x; y 2 X, and u; v 2 I(x; y):
Remark 1. Observe that Idempotence and Convexity are indeed mutually indepen-
dent properties of interval spaces. To conrm that statement, consider interval spaces
I1 = (X; I1), I2 = (fx; y; v; zg ; I2) where jXj > 1, j fx; y; v; zg j = 4; I1(a; b) = X for
all a; b 2 X, while I2(x; y) = fx; y; zg, I2(y; z) = fy; v; zg, and I2(a; b) = fa; bg for all
a; b 2 X such that fx; yg 6= fa; bg 6= fy; zg. It is immediately checked that I1 is convex
but not idempotent, while I2 is idempotent but not convex since fy; zg  I2(x; y) and
v 2 I2(y; z) n I2(x; y).13
Finally, we should also mention that an interval space I = (X; I) is said to be a
median space if I satises the following
(Median Property): for all x; y; z 2 X, jI(x; y) \ I(y; z) \ I(x; z)j = 1.
The common point of the three intervals dened by each pair of any three points
x; y; z in a median interval space (X; I) is said to be the median of those points, that
therefore denes a ternary operation on X.
It is well-known that e.g. the interval spaces induced by trees or median semilat-
tices (including distributive lattices) are median (see Sholander (1952), (1954)), and
that any median interval space is also convex (see Mulder (1980), Theorem 3.1.4) and
idempotent. It should also be emphasized that all the properties of an interval space
considered above are inherited by its interval subspaces.
13An idempotent interval space (X; I) is said to be a convex geometry if it satises
(Peano Convexity) for all x; y; v1; v2; z 2 X, if y 2 I(x; v1) and z 2 I(y; v2) then there exists
v 2 I(v1; v2) such that z 2 I(x; v).
It can be quite easily shown that a convex geometry is in particular a convex interval space (see
e.g. Coppel (1998), chpt.2, Proposition 1), but the converse however does not hold. Therefore all of
the results of the present paper clearly hold in particular when restricting the statements to convex
geometries.
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Let < denote a total preorder i.e. a reexive, connected and transitive binary rela-
tion on X (we shall denote by  and  its asymmetric and symmetric components,
respectively. The following notation shall also be occasionally used to denote the upper
and lower contours of <: for any x 2 X, UC(<; x) := fy 2 X : y < xg ; LC(<; x) :=
fy 2 X : x < yg, UC(<; x) := fy 2 X : y  xg ; LC(<; x) := fy 2 X : x  yg).
Then, the total preorder < is said to be weakly unimodal with respect to interval
space I = (X; I) - or I-weakly unimodal14 - if and only if
U -(i) there exists a unique maximum of < in X, its top outcome -denoted top(<)-
and
U -(ii) for all x; y; z 2 X, if z 2 I(x; y) and x = top(<) then z < y.
We denote by UI the set of all I-weakly unimodal total preorders on X.
A set of weakly unimodal total preorders D  UI is rich if for any x; y 2 X there
exists <2 D such that top(<) = x and UC(<; y) = I(x; y).
Two important and widely studied subclasses of UI are I-unimodal and I-locally
strictly unimodal total preorders on X which obtain by combining U -(i) with
U 0-(ii) for all x; y; z 2 X, if z 2 I(x; y) then fu 2 X : z < ug \ fx; yg 6= ?
and
U 00-(ii) for all x; y; z 2 X, if z 2 I(x; y) and x = top(<) then z  y, respectively.
An N -prole of I-weakly unimodal total preorders is a mapping from N into UI . We
denote by UNI the full I-weakly unimodal domain, namely the set of all N -proles
of I-unimodal total preorders (the full I-unimodal and full I-locally strictly uni-
modal domains are similarly dened in the obvious way).
An aggregation rule for (N;X) is a function f : XN ! X . The following properties
of an aggregation rule are key to the ensuing analysis:
(Strategy-proofness) An aggregation rule f : XN ! X is (simply) strategy-
proof on DN  UNI i¤ for all (<i)i2N 2 DN , and for all i 2 N , yi 2 X, and (xj)j2N 2
XN such that xj = top(<j) for each j 2 N , f((xj)j2N) <i f((yi; (xj)j2Nrfig)).
(Coalitional strategy-proofness) An aggregation rule f : XN ! X is coalition-
ally strategy-proof on DN  UNI i¤ for all (<i)i2N 2 UNI , and for all C  N ,
(yi)i2C 2 XC , and (xj)j2N 2 XN such that xj = top(<j) for each j 2 N , there exists
i 2 C with f((xj)j2N) <i f((yi)i2C ; (xj)j2NrC))15.
Clearly, a coalitionally strategy-proof aggregation rule is in particular strategy-proof,
while the converse may not hold.
14The I-qualier will be typically omitted when the relevant I is unambiguously identied.
15Notice that coalitional strategy-proofness as dened here is only concerned with coalitional manip-
ulations that are strictly advantageous for every member of the coalition. That version of coalitional
strategy-proofness is the one adopted e.g. by Moulin (1980) and Danilov (1994). Other, stronger
notions that are also considered in the extant literature will not concern us here.
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(Interval-monotonicity) An aggregation rule f : XN ! X is I-monotonic
(or interval-monotonic) i¤ for all i 2 N , yi 2 X, and (xj)j2N 2 XN , f((xj)j2N) 2
I(xi; f(yi; (xj)j2Nrfig)).
We are now ready to state the main results of this paper concerning equivalence of
strategy-proofness and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules on any rich
domain of weakly unimodal proles. Our results rely on the following proposition which
establishes the equivalence between monotonicity with respect to an arbitrary convex
interval space I and strategy-proofness on any rich weakly unimodal domain DN  UNI .
Proposition 1. Let I = (X; I) be a convex interval space. Then, an aggregation rule
f : XN ! X is strategy-proof on a rich weakly unimodal domain DN  UNI i¤ it is
I-monotonic.
Remark 2 Proposition 1 above provides a considerable generalization of Lemma
1 in Danilov (1994) which only refers to the median interval space induced by a nite
tree. Moreover, it may also be regarded as a counterpart to -and an extension of-
Proposition 3.2 in Nehring, Puppe (2007(a)), which concerns a quite specialized class
of convex interval spaces (namely, those induced by property spaceswhich also satisfy
Antisymmetry as discussed below -hence Idempotence- and Separation as dened in
Nehring, Puppe (2007) (a), p. 278, i.e. the S3 property of van de Vel (1993), p. 53).
Actually, it transpires from the proof of Proposition 1 that I-monotonicity of an
aggregation rule f : XN  ! X implies its strategy-proofness on any rich domain
DN  UNI for any interval space I, whether convex or not. However, in order to prove
that strategy-proofness of f on DN invariably implies I-monotonicity of f , convexity
of I cannot be dispensed with. To see this, consider the following simple example with
N = f1; 2g, I = (X = fx; y; u; v; zg ; I) such that jXj = 5, I(x; y) = fx; y; u; vg, and
I(a; b) = X, I(a; a) = fag for all a; b 2 X such that a 6= b and fa; bg 6= fx; yg. Clearly,
I is by construction not convex since e.g. u; v 2 I(x; y) but z 2 I(u; v) r I(x; y).
Now, take DN = UNI and consider an aggregation rule f : X  X  ! X such that
f(a; b) = f(a; c) for all a; b; c 2 X, f(x; x) = z and f(a; x) = a for all a 2 X r fxg.
By construction, f(x; x) =2 I(x; f(y; x)) hence f is not I-monotonic. Now, notice that
agent 2 is a dummy hence f -if it is not strategy-proof on UNI - can only be manipulated
by agent 1. Let us now check that in fact agent 1 cannot manipulate f and therefore f
is strategy-proof on UNI . Indeed, suppose to the contrary and without loss of generality
that there exists <2 UI such that x = top(<) and x  y  z. We may distinguish two
possible cases: (i) there exists a 2 X r fx; yg such that a < y, and (ii) y  a for all
a 2 X r fx; yg. If (i) holds then z 2 X = I(y; a) whence weak unimodality is violated
i.e. <=2 UI , a contradiction. If (ii) holds, then x  y  a 2 I(x; y) hence again <=2 UI ,
a contradiction, and strategy-proofness of f is therefore established.
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The following property will play a pivotal role in the ensuing analysis
(Interval Anti-Exchange (IAE)): for all x; y; v; z 2 X such that x 6= y, if x 2
I(y; v) and y 2 I(x; z) then x 2 I(v; z).16
The next condition is a considerably weakened version of IAE:
(Minimal Anti-Exchange (MAE)): for all x; y; v; z 2 X such that x 6= y and
v 6= z at least one of the following clauses is satised: (i) I(y; v) \ fx; zg 6= fx; zg, (ii)
I(x; z) \ fy; vg 6= fy; vg, (iii) I(v; z) \ fx; yg 6= ?, (iv) I(y; z) \ fx; vg 6= ?.
Remark 3 It is easily checked that, for an arbitrary interval space I = (X; I), IAE
does indeed entail MAE, while the converse statement does not generally hold. To see
this, observe that by denition IAE amounts to requiring that for all x; y; v; z 2 X
such that x 6= y, at least one of the following three clauses is satised: (i) x =2 I(y; v),
(ii) y =2 I(x; z), (iii) x 2 I(v; z). Clearly, (i),(ii) and (iii) entail (i),(ii) and (iii),
respectively, whence MAE holds true whenever IAE does. On the other hand, consider
interval space I = (X; I) with X = fx; y; v; zg, jXj = 4, and I as dened by the
following rule: I(x; z) = fx; y; zg, I(y; v) = fx; y; vg, and I(a; b) = fa; bg otherwise.
Notice that, by construction, I is convex and idempotent. Moreover, I(x; z)\ fy; vg =
fyg 6= fy; vg hence I satises MAE. However, x 2 I(y; v), y 2 I(x; z), and x =2 I(v; z):
therefore I fails to satisfy IAE.
The next proposition provides a remarkable property of I-monotonic aggregation
rules when I satises Interval Anti-Exchange:
Proposition 2. Let I = (X; I) be an interval space that satises Interval Anti-Exchange,
and f : XN ! X an I-monotonic aggregation rule. Then, for all xN ; yN 2 XN ,
f(xN) 6= f(yN) entails that f(xN) 2 I(xi; yi) for some i 2 N .
As suggested by the crucial role it plays in the proof of the foregoing proposition, In-
terval Anti-Exchange is denitely required to ensure that the property of I-monotonic
16It should be noticed here that Interval Anti-Exchange, Idempotence and Convexity are mutually
independent properties of an interval space. To check that statement, consider the following interval
spaces: (i) (X = fx; y; u; vg ; I) with I(x; y) = fx; u; yg, I(u; y) = fu; v; yg and I(a; b) = fa; bg for
all fa; bg =2 ffx; yg ; fu; ygg, which is by construction idempotent and can be easily shown to satisfy
IAE, but is clearly not convex; (ii) (X = fx; yg ; I) with I(x; x) = I(x; y) = fx; yg, I(y; y) = fyg: that
interval space is not idempotent but -as it is easily seen- it satises IAE and is obviously convex; (iii)
(X = fx; y; zg ; I) with I(x; z) = I(y; z) = fx; y; zg, and I(a; b) = fa; bg for all fa; bg =2 ffx; zg ; fy; zgg,
which is by construction idempotent and convex but fails to satisfy IAE since x 2 I(y; z), y 2 I(x; z)
and x =2 I(z; z).
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aggregation rules identied by Proposition 2 does indeed hold. To conrm that, con-
sider again the median interval space I =(23; Im) induced by the Boolean cube and
the ternary median operation  on 23 as dened above in Section 2. It is easily
checked that I =(23; Im) does not satisfy Interval Anti-Exchange: e.g. x1 2 Im(x5; 1),
x5 2 Im(x1; x3) but x1 =2 Im(1; x3) = f1; x3g. It can also be shown that  is I-
monotonic, because projections and constants are obviously I-monotonic, and the me-
dian preserves I-monotonicity and can be represented as an iterated median of projec-
tions and constants (see Danilov, Sotskov (2002) and Savaglio, Vannucci (2014) for de-
tails). Next, take a I-unimodal preference prole (<1;<2;<3) such that top(<1) = x1,
top(<2) = x2, top(<3) = 0, and x3 i x4 for all i 2 f1; 2; 3g as previously consid-
ered in Section 2, and notice that (x1; x2; 0) = x4, while (x3; x3; 0) = x3. However,
Im(x1; x3) = f1; x1; x3; x5g, Im(x2; x3) = f1; x2; x3; x6g, Im(0; 0) = f0g hence x4 =2
Im(x1; x3) [ Im(x2; x3) [ Im(0; 0): thus, the thesis of Proposition 2 fails to hold for 
(for that choice of I).
The next Theorem establishes that in convex idempotent interval spaces Interval
Anti-Exchange ensures that simple (or individual) strategy-proofness and coalitional
strategy-proofness of an aggregation rule are equivalent properties on any rich weakly
unimodal domain.
Theorem 1. Let I = (X; I) be a convex idempotent interval space that satises Interval
Anti-Exchange (IAE), and f : XN ! X an aggregation which is strategy-proof on a
rich weakly unimodal domain DN  UNI . Then, f is also coalitionally strategy-proof on
DN .
Observe that, as mentioned in the Introduction, the argument underlying Theorem
1 may be summarized as follows: (a) strategy-proofness of an aggregation rule f on a
rich weakly unimodal domain in a convex idempotent interval space and Interval Anti-
Exchange of that space jointly imply that two arbitrary outcome-proles xN ,yN result in
distinct outcomes u = f(xN), v = f(yN) only if -for at least one agent i with xi 6= yi-
u is a compromisebetween v and is choice xi at xN ; but then, (b) if xi is the top
outcome of voter i, weak unimodality implies that v cannot be strictly better than u for
voter i, whence coalitional strategy-proofness of f follows.
It should be noticed here that Propositions 1 and 2 and Theorem 1 extend and
generalize some properties of the standard interval spaces induced by trees that are
pointed out and exploited by Danilov (1994). Moreover, it turns out that Theorem
1 implies at once that simple/individual and coalitional strategy-proofness on any rich
weakly I-unimodal domain are equivalent if I = (X; I) satises the following property,
namely :
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(Antisymmetry): for all x; y; z 2 X, if x 2 I(y; z) and y 2 I(x; z) then x = y.17
Indeed, the following Corollary to Theorem 1 obtains18
Corollary 1. Let I = (X; I) be an antisymmetric interval space such that jXj  3,
and f : XN ! X a voting rule that is strategy-proof on the full weakly unimodal domain
UNI . Then, f is also coalitionally strategy-proof on U
N
I .
It should also be emphasized that Theorem 1 above amounts to a considerable gener-
alization of two classic previous results on equivalence of simple and coalitional strategy-
proofness due to Moulin (1980) and Danilov (1994), concerning bounded chains and
nite trees, respectively.
We conclude with a partial converse result. Namely, a convex idempotent interval
space I ensures equivalence of simple and coalitional strategy-proofness on the full
weakly unimodal domain only if it also satises Minimal Anti-Exchange, as established
by the following:
Theorem 2. Let I = (X; I) be a convex and idempotent interval space such that every
aggregation rule f : XN ! X which is strategy-proof on any rich weakly unimodal
domain DN  UNI is also coalitionally strategy-proof on DN . Then, I = (X; I) satises
Minimal Anti-Exchange (MAE).
Notice that minor adaptations of the proof of the foregoing Theorem establish its
counterparts concerning both the full unimodal domain and the full locally strictly
unimodal domain for I.19 Notice that Theorem 2 holds for both median and nonmedian
17Observe that Antisymmetry implies Idempotence of an interval space I = (X; I): to see that, no-
tice that since x 2 I(y; x) by Extension, y 2 I(x; x) for some y 6= x entails a violation of Antisymmetry.
18To be sure, the present Corollary also follows from a result due to Barberà, Berga, Moreno (2010)
establishing that coalitional strategy-proofness holds for any strategy-proof social choice function with
an arbitrary domain of proles of total preorders over an outcome set with at most three outcomes. The
proof of the latter result, however, relies on a set-theoretic property called sequential inclusion(see
Section 4 below). Thus we almostprove by incidence-geometric arguments the (stronger) proposition
previously obtained by Barberà-Berga-Moreno through purely combinatorial arguments. We report
here our Corollary 1 and its proof precisely to highlight this point. Notice that unfortunately we cannot
ameliorate our result by IAE-based incidence-geometric arguments: to check that, just consider the
three-point interval space
(X = fx; y; zg ; I) with I(y; z) = I(z; y) = I(x; z) = I(z; x) = X and
I(a; b) = fa; bg for any other pair fa; bg.
Clearly, (X; I) is not antisymmetric and violates IAE.
19Actually, the proof of Theorem 2 is immediately adapted to the unimodal case. A proof for rich
locally strictly unimodal domains is easily produced by replacing preorders <and <0as dened in the
proof of Theorem 2 with a suitable pair of linear orders rening them. More details are available from
the author upon request.
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interval spaces. One of the simplest examples of a convex idempotent space that fails to
satisfy MAE is the median interval space (X; Im) induced by the Boolean lattice 22 =
(f0; 1; x; yg ;_;^) by taking X = f0; 1; x; yg and dening Im by the rule Im(a; b) =
fc 2 X : a ^ b 6 c 6 a _ bg where u 6 v if and only if u = u ^ v. Indeed, the results
of Savaglio, Vannucci (2014) imply equivalence failure in such an interval space (and,
more generally, in any interval space induced by a bounded distributive lattice that is
not a chain). Moreover, a simple adaptation of the foregoing proof also shows that the
median  : f0; 1; x; yg3  ! f0; 1; x; yg as dened by the rule (z1; z2; z3) = (z1 ^ z2) _
(z1^ z3)_ (z2^ z3) is not coalitionally strategy-proof on UNI with I = (f0; 1; x; yg ; Im):
to see this, just consider a third total preorder <such that x  y  v  z, and
observe that <2 UI , (v; y; x) = x and (z; z; x) = z, hence coalition f1; 2g can
successfully manipulate the sinceremedian outcome at unimodal preference prole
(<;<0;<) 2 U3I as dened above in the proof of Theorem 2.
Now, as it is well-known, the interval spaces thus induced by distributive lattices
are another prominent class of median interval spaces (along with the interval spaces
induced by trees). Notice however that since partial cubes typically include cubes, their
(typically non-median) interval spaces also violate MAE and therefore -precisely as the
interval space of a Boolean distributive lattice 2K with K >1- admit nontrivial nondic-
tatorial strategy-proof voting rules (such as rule f as dened in the proof of Theorem
2) that are not coalitionally strategy-proof. Indeed, in view of the proof of Theorem
2 (and as also suggested by Corollary 1 above), if a given convex idempotent interval
space fails to satisfy MAE then there exists a non-trivial non-dictatorial strategy-proof
voting rule on the full weakly unimodal domain of that space that admits at least four
distinct outcomes, and is manipulable by some coalitions. Therefore Theorem 2 con-
rms that, generally speaking, weakly unimodalequivalence of simple and coalitional
strategy-proofness fails to hold in several important classes of interval spaces, both
median and non-median.
In particular, relying on Theorems 1 and 2 we are now ready to provide a denite an-
swer to the question concerning equivalence of simple and coalitional strategy-proofness
of aggregation rules for rich weakly unimodal domains in the outcomes spaces considered
in Section 2 above. That answer is detailed and included in the next Corollary where
weakly unimodal equivalence is to be read as a shorthand for equivalence of simple and
coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules for rich weakly unimodal domains (in
the interval space under consideration), and the inserted bibliography items single out
results previously established -or implied- through alternative ad hoc arguments by
other Authors (and address the reader to the original sources or Authors).20
Corollary 2. Let I be a convex and idempotent interval space. Then
20It should also be noticed that we could also easily obtain specialized versions of Theorems 1-2 and
Corollary 1 for both full unimodal and full locally strictly unimodal domains.
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(i) (Moulin (1980)) if I =(X; I(6)) is the median interval space canonically induced
by a bounded chain X = (X;6) then weakly unimodal equivalence holds;
(ii) (Danilov (1994)) if I = (X; IG) is the median interval space canonically induced
by a nite tree G = (X;E) (see notes 4 and 5) then weakly unimodal equivalence holds;
(iii) (Gibbard, Satterthwaite and others) if I =(X; IG) is the interval space canoni-
cally induced by a clique G = (X;E) then weakly unimodal equivalence holds;
(iv) (Nehring, Puppe (2007 (b)), Savaglio, Vannucci (2014)) if I = (X; Im) is the
median interval space canonically induced by a bounded distributive lattice X = (X;6
; 0; 1) which is not a chain then weakly unimodal equivalence fails;
(v) if I = (X; IE) is the interval space canonically induced by a simplex in an Euclid-
ean convex space then weakly unimodal equivalence holds;
(vi) if I = (X; I(6)) is the interval space canonically induced by a partially ordered
set X = (X;6) then weakly unimodal equivalence holds;
(vii) if I = (X; IG) is the interval space canonically induced by a partial cube G =
(X;E) which is not a tree then weakly unimodal equivalence fails;
(viii) if I = (X; IG) is the interval space canonically induced by the graph G = (X;E)
resulting from the join of a clique and a bounded chain then weakly unimodal equivalence
holds.
Notice that point (i) is established by Moulin (1980) 21 through specic arguments
based upon properties of medians in chains, and an explicit proof is only given for a
subclass of anonymous strategy-proof social choice functions. Point (ii) is established
by Danilov (1994) for the subdomain of unimodal linear orders in a tree by means of
an argument that implicitly relies on Interval Anti-Exchange.
Point (iii) can also be regarded as a corollary to well-known results which can be
established without any reference to Interval Anti-Exchange, but some care is needed
to articulate a proper argument which substantiates that claim. Indeed, what follows
from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem for the universaldomain of linear orders is
that if jXj  3 then the only strategy-proof aggregation rules for the full unimodal
domain are the constant rules, the dictatorial rules (which are both also coalitionally
strategy-proof), and possibly some other non-sovereign (i.e. non-surjective) aggregation
rules with a two-valued range. However, it can be easily shown that no such two-valued
rule is strategy-proof on a rich weakly unimodal domain.22 Moreover, if jXj 6 3 then
the combinatorial argument provided by Barberà, Berga, Moreno (2010) implies that
any aggregation rule on X is strategy-proof on an arbitrary domain of total preorders
if and only if it is also coalitionally strategy-proof on that domain.
21To be sure, Moulin proves a version of Corollary (ii) for a restricted unimodal domain where
voters are not allowed to have the maximum or the minimum of the chain (or lattice) as their unique
optimum. But Moulins proof can be adapted to the full unimodal domain (and to the full weakly
unimodal domain).
22Details are available from the author upon request.
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Point (iv) concerning equivalence failure on any rich weakly unimodal domain in
bounded distributive lattices was recently established by Savaglio, Vannucci (2014) by
a direct argument that implicitly invokes necessity of Minimal Anti-Exchange, and is
implied by Nehring, Puppe (2007 (b)) with reference to the locally strictly unimodal
domain.
Thus, the proofs of points (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) of Corollary 2 proposed here o¤er an al-
ternative general argument to establish those points by means of Interval Anti-Exchange
and/or Minimal Anti-Exchange.
Points (v)-(vii) of Corollary 2 are -to the best of the authors knowledge- entirely
novel results.
Finally, the outcome space of point (viii) is a special case of the space considered
by Schummer,Vohra (2002) whose focus however is strategy-proofness on domains of
metric-based total preorders with a unique top outcome.
Apparently, interval anti-exchange properties (through Theorems 1 and 2) provide
a common unifying approach to weakly unimodal equivalenceissues which o¤ers both
a new proof of several important well-known theorems and some quite interesting novel
results. Some comments on the practical signicance of those results when combined
with information on the median vs. non-median character of the relevant interval space
are in order here.
We have already observed that when the interval space is median and weakly uni-
modal equivalence obtains (see cases (i),(ii), (vi) of Corollary 2), it follows that the
simple majority rule is both well-dened and coalitionally strategy-proof, thus provid-
ing a successful solution to a most important mechanism design problem for aggregation
rules.
If the relevant interval space is median and weakly unimodal equivalence fails (see
case (iv) of Corollary 2) then the simple majority rule is well dened and strategy-proof
but is not coalitionally strategy-proof. That fact typically signals that reasonably un-
biased and coalitionally strategy-proof aggregation rules may not exist, and acceptable
solutions (if they exist at all) have to embody trade-o¤s between those two requirements.
When weakly unimodal equivalence obtains and the interval space is not median (e.g.
cases (iii), (v), (viii) of Corollary 2) then the median-related rules are not-well dened.
Thus, strategy-proof aggregation rules may either reduce to dictatorial and constant
rules (see case (iii), which is the situation typied by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite im-
possibility result) or include some minimally unbiased rule (see case (viii)). But in any
case, of course, there is nothing to be gained by relaxing the requirement of coalitional
strategy-proofness to simple strategy-proofness.
When the interval space is not median and weakly unimodal equivalence fails (e.g.
case (vii) of Corollary 2) the simple majority rule is not well-dened, which typically
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implies that perfectly unbiased strategy-proof aggregation rules are not available. Fur-
ther work will establishe if and when viable compromises between unbiasedness and
(coalitional) strategy-proofness are in fact available
In that connection, point (viii) provides a somewhat positive result for outcome
spaces consisting of the join of a bounded chain and a clique, whose interval space is
non-median: namely, in that case the rule resulting from the combination of a local
dictatorship and a local simple majority rule (along the lines proposed by Schummer,
Vohra (2002) in their related but distinct framework) is coalitionally strategy-proof on
any rich weakly unimodal domain.
4. Related literature
Since the relationships of our results to previous works concerning strategy-proof ag-
gregation rules and their coalitional strategy-proofness properties have been repeatedly
discussed in the text, culminating in Corollary 2, the present section will rather focus
on previous attempts to provide general conditions under which equivalence between
simple and coalitional strategy-proofness obtains.
Le Breton, Zaporozhets (2009) identies a general richness condition on a set D of
total preorders on an outcome set X which ensures that any social choice function
f : DN ! X that is regular (namely such that every outcome in f(DN) is the unique
top outcome of some total preorder in D) is strategy-proof if and only if it is also
coalitionally strategy-proof.23 That richness condition is dened as follows: a set D of
total preorders onX is said to be rich with respect to strictly monotonic transformations
(or SMT-rich) if for every total preorder < in D and every pair of outcomes x; y 2 X
such that x  y and x = top(<0) for some total preorder <0 in D there exists a a total
preorder < in D such that x = top(<) and y  z for all z 6= y with y < z.
Le Breton, Zaporozhets (2009) only briey addresses the case of single peakeddo-
mains, claiming essentially that single peaked domainslarge enough to support sur-
jective social choice functions are SMT-rich: but that paper clearly refers to (what we
denoted as) locally strictly unimodal preference proles in a chain. When moving to
general (full) unimodal domains, the verdict concerning SMT-richness is in fact much
more blurred.
To begin with, observe that the social choice functions associated to aggregation rules
on full weakly unimodal domains clearly satisfy by denition the general regularity
clause of the Le Breton-Zaporozhets proposition. However, the collection UI of all
weakly unimodal total preorders of a convex and idempotent (or even median) interval
space I = (X; I) may be or may be not SMT-rich, depending on the choice of I. For
instance, if I = (X; I) is the interval space of a clique (which, recall, amounts to the
23Note that social choice functions whose outcomes only depend on proles of top outcomes essen-
tially amount to voting rules which inherit the strategy-proofness properties of the former: thus results
of this type concerning social choice functions are also relevant to voting rules.
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universaldomain of all total preorders with a unique maximum) then UI is clearly
SMT-rich. On the contrary, if I = (X; I) is the interval space of a Boolean hypercube
then UI is not SMT-rich. To see that, consider for the sake of simplicity the Boolean
square 22 = f(x; y) : x; y 2 f0; 1gg and its canonical interval space I , unimodal total
preorder < such that (1; 0)  (1; 1)  (0; 1)  (0; 0), and outcomes (1; 0), (0; 1).
SMT-richness of UI would imply existence of a weakly unimodal total preorder <0in UI
such that (1; 0) 0 (0; 1) 0 (1; 1) and (1; 0) 0 (0; 1) 0 (0; 0). Since by construction
(1; 0), (0; 1) is a pair of opposite pointsI((1; 0), (0; 1)) = 22 : it follows that <0 is not
weakly unimodal since e.g. L(<0; (1; 1))\f(1; 0); (0; 1)g = ? whence SMT-richness fails
here. Concerning SMT-richness of (full) weakly unimodal domains in chains or trees,
additional clarications may be obtained by the discussion of Barberà, Berga, Moreno
(2010) to follow.
Indeed, Barberà, Berga, Moreno (2010) also studies general su¢ cient conditions of a
combinatorial nature ensuring equivalence of simple and coalitional strategy-proofness
of social choice functions and aggregation rules on arbitrary preference domains. In
particular, two such su¢ cient conditions for single proles are identied and denoted
as Sequential Inclusion, a requirement that applies to single preference proles (i.e.
an intraprole condition), and Indirect Sequential Inclusion (an interprole existence
or richness condition based upon Sequential Inclusion). Specically, for each pref-
erence prole (<i)i2N Sequential Inclusion relies on a family of binary relations <
(S((<i)i2N ; y; z)) as parameterized by ordered pairs (y; z) of outcomes and dened on
S((<i)i2N ; y; z), the set of agents who strictly prefer y to z at (<i)i2N : in particular,
agent pair (i; j) is in < (S((<i)i2N ; y; z)) if and only if i and j are in S((<i)i2N ; y; z) and
L(z;<i)  L(y;<j). Of course any such < (S((<i)i2N ; y; z)) is reexive: Sequential
Inclusion requires that all of them be also connected and acyclic. Indirect Sequential
Inclusion is satised by a prole (<i)i2N if either (<i)i2N itself satisfy Sequential Inclu-
sion or for each pair (y; z) of outcomes there exists a prole (<0i: i 2 S((<i)i2N ; y; z))
such that: (i) y 0i z for each i 2 S((<i)i2N ; y; z), (ii) z 0i x for each i 2 S((<i)i2N ; y; z)
and each outcome x 6= z such that z <i x, and (iii) < (S((<0i: i 2 S((<i)i2N ; y; z)))
is connected and acyclic. A preference domain is then said to satisfy Sequential In-
clusion (Indirect Sequential Inclusion) if each preference prole in that domain does
satisfy it. Moreover, in Barberà, Berga, Moreno (2010) it is also shown that if the
outcome set and the preference domain DN of a social choice function meet a mild
consistency clause (i.e. they may also be the outcome set and preference domain of a
surjective and regular social choice function according to the denition by Le Breton
and Zaporozhets as reported above) then DN is SMT-rich only if it also satises Indirect
Sequential Inclusion. Now, observe that our full weakly unimodal domains obviously
satisfy that consistency clause. Hence, when it comes to full weakly unimodal domains
UNI as discussed in the present paper, Indirect Sequential Inclusion qualies as a more
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general su¢ cient condition than SMT-richness for equivalence of simple and coalitional
strategy-proofness.
Under the label single peaked domainsBarberà, Berga, Moreno (2010) addresses the
case of locally strictly unimodal domains in a chain, and points out that such domains
satisfy Sequential Inclusion and therefore support equivalence of simple and coalitional
strategy-proofness.
Thus, (Indirect) Sequential Inclusion and related properties seem to work quite well
to assess equivalence of simple and coalitional strategy-proofness in (at least some)
locally strictly unimodal domains.
However, rich weakly unimodal proles of total preorders in a chain may well violate
Sequential Inclusion, as established by the following example.
Let 6 be a linear order on an outcome set X = fx; y; z; wg such that x < y < z < w,
and N = f1; 2g. Next, consider total preorders <1 and <2 on X dened as follows
(using a most conventional notation, with i and i denoting of course the asymmetric
and symmetric components of <i, i = 1; 2):
x 1 y 1 w 1 z and z 2 y 2 w 2 x.
Notice that unimodality (hence weak unimodality) of <1 on (X; I(6)) holds because
I(6)(x; y) = fx; yg hence I(6)(x; y) \ fw; zg = ? (and the second unimodality clause
is also trivially satised), and unimodality of <2 on (X;6) holds because I(6)(z; y) =
fz; yg hence I(6)(z; y) \ fw; xg = ? (and the second unimodality clause is trivially
satised, again).
Now, consider S((R1; R2); (y; w)) and (S((R1; R2); (y; w))) as dened above. Clearly,
S((R1; R2); (y; w)) := fi 2 f1; 2g : w 2 L(Ri; y)g = f1; 2g.
Moreover, z 2 L(R1; w)r L(R2; y), and x 2 L(R2; w)r L(R1; y):
Hence, by denition, neither 1  (S((R1; R2); (y; w)))2
nor 2  (S((R1; R2); (y; w)))1. Therefore,  (S((R1; R2); (y; w))) is not connected :
it follows that prole RN = (R1; R2) -while being unimodal on chain (X;6) - does not
satisfy Sequential Inclusion.
It can also be easily checked by the reader that the foregoing prole does not satisfy
Indirect Sequential Inclusion either, because the required strictly monotonic transfor-
mation <01of unimodal total preorder <1 should be such that y 01 w 01 z hence not
unimodal on (X; I(6)) since z 2 I(6)(y; w). Furthermore, consider the same prole
with X = 22, x = (1; 1), y = (1; 0), w = (0; 1), z = (0; 0) i.e. the Boolean square
as endowed with its canonical interval space (X; Im) that has been repeatedly consid-
ered in the present paper. It can be shown (an exercise left to the reader) that the
given prole is unimodal in the Boolean square but does not satisfy Indirect Sequential
Inclusion because e.g. the required strictly monotonic transformations of <1 would nec-
essarily end up again in a total preorder <01 such that y 01 w 01 z while z 2 Im(y; w)
hence not unimodal. It follows that, as previously claimed in the Introduction, the
results included in Barberà, Berga, Moreno (2010) are in fact quite inconclusive about
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equivalence of simple and coalitional strategy-proofness on full unimodal domains (let
alone full weakly unimodal) in Boolean hypercubes and even in bounded chains (where
equivalence is in fact well-established in the full unimodal domain thanks to Moulin
(1980)).
Therefore, Indirect Sequential Inclusion and related properties denitely fail in the
assessment of simple and coalitional strategy-proofness properties for aggregation rules
on full unimodal domains and therefore on the wider full weakly unimodal domain as
considered in the present paper. That apparent weakness of Indirect Sequential Inclu-
sion should be contrasted with the remarkable e¤ectiveness of Interval Anti-Exchange
in the analysis of coalitional strategy-proofness properties on full weakly unimodal do-
mains.
Indeed, a general comment on SMT-richness, Indirect Sequential Inclusion and In-
terval Anti-Exchange as alternative su¢ cient conditions for equivalence of simple and
coalitional strategy-proofness of an aggregation rule on a rich weakly unimodal domain
is in order here. SMT-richness and the even more general Indirect Sequential Inclusion
property are meant to apply to virtually arbitrary preference domains hence are per-
force just set-theoretic restrictions, while Interval Anti-Exchange takes full advantage of
the incidence-geometric structure embodied in the interval space underlying the relevant
unimodal domain. As a consequence, it is indeed not so di¢ cult to devise necessary
conditions for equivalence of simple and coalitional strategy-proofness on rich weakly
unimodal domains that are similar to (in fact a considerable weakening of) Interval
Anti-Exchange, as testied by Theorem 2 of the present paper. By contrast, identify-
ing necessary conditions for such an equivalence by just relying on some weakening of
SMT-richness or Indirect Sequential Inclusion is bound to be quite an hard task, that is
very unlikely to be accomplished without introducing novel, specic restrictions more
or less explicitly related to the relevant interval-space-theoretic structure. As a matter
of fact, Le Breton, Zaporozhets (2009) does not address at all the issue of necessary
conditions for equivalence, while Barberà, Berga, Moreno (2010) does include a result
on necessary conditions for equivalence of simple and coalitional strategy-proofness that
relies on Indirect Sequential Inclusion (see Barberà, Berga, Moreno (2010), Theorem 4).
However, quite remarkably, the latter result combines Indirect Sequential Inclusion and
closure of the preference domain with respect to preference inversions, a condition bla-
tantly violated by full unimodal domains of total preorders, and therefore hardly helpful
in the analysis of arbitrary rich weakly unimodal domains. In any case, it still remains
to be explored the exact relationship of Interval Anti-Exchange properties to Minimal
Anti-Exchange and the conditions -if any- under which the latter is also su¢ cient to
ensure equivalence of simple and coalitional strategy-proofness.
24 STEFANO VANNUCCI
5. Concluding remarks
It should be emphasized again that the su¢ cient condition for equivalence of simple
and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules on rich weakly unimodal domains
which has been established in the present paper is in fact quite general. As repeatedly
mentioned above, Interval Anti-Exchange (IAE) is shared by all trees and indeed by
all linear geometries24 including Euclidean convex spaces but is characteristic of a much
larger class of convex idempotent interval spaces. Therefore, our results provide sig-
nicant information concerning problems of strategy-proof location in a vast class of
networks, as testied by Corollary 2. Moreover, it can be shown that Theorem 1 also
implies that the median voter theoremfor committee-decisions - establishing that the
extended n-ary median over an oddunimodal domain invariably selects a Condorcet
majority winner - holds whenever the underlying median interval space satises Interval
Anti-Exchange (the details will be spelled out elsewhere).
We have also shown that any convex idempotent interval space where the foregoing
unimodalequivalence obtains must satisfy Minimal Anti-Exchange (MAE), which in
turn implies that such equivalence fails to hold in certain convex idempotent interval
spaces, both median and non-median (and that such spaces admit the existence of
non-trivial non-dictatorial strategy-proof aggregation rules with at least four distinct
outcomes on their full unimodal domains). It remains to be seen whether or not some
convex, idempotent interval spaces that satisfy MAE while violating IAE do also sup-
port such an equivalence of simple and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation
rules on rich weakly unimodal domains. For any such interval space (both median and
non-median), and for all convex, idempotent interval spaces that satisfy IAE but are
not median the search for reasonably unbiased and coalitionally strategy-proof voting
rules on large single peaked domains is a somewhat intriguing and possibly challenging
open problem for future research.
6. Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
Let us assume that f : XN ! X is not I-monotonic: thus, there exist i 2 N , x0i 2 X
and xN = (xi)i2N 2 XN such that f(xN) =2 I(xi; f(x0i; xNrfig)). Thus, by Extension
of I, xi 6= f(xN) 6= f(x0i; xNrfig).To begin with, observe that for any x 2 X, if there
exists <2I such that x = top( <) then I(x; x) = fxg. Indeed, suppose that there
exists y 6= x such that y 2 I(x; x): then by denition < is not weakly unimodal with
respect to I hence <=2 D, a contradiction. Next, consider a total preorder <2 D such
that xi = top(<) and UC(<; f(x0i; xNrfig)) = I(xi; f(x0i; xNrfig)). Such a preorder
exists since D is rich. Now, by assumption f(xN) 2 X r I(xi; f(x0i; xNrfig)) while
24Once again, the reader is referred to Coppel (1998) for the relevant denitions.
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f(x0i; xNrfig) 2 I(xi; f(x0i; xNrfig)) by Extension, hence by construction f(x0i; xNrfig) 
f(xN). Finally, consider (<j)j2N 2 DN such that xj = top(<j) for all j 2 N and
<i=<: then, f is not strategy-proof on DN .
Conversely, let f be monotonic with respect to I. Next, consider any weakly unimodal
prole < = (<j)j2N 2 DN and any i 2 N . By denition of I-monotonicity f(top(<i
); xNrfig) 2 I(top(<i); f(xi; xNrfig)) for all xNrfig 2 XNrfig and xi 2 X. But then,
since clearly by denition top(<i) <i f(top(<i); xNrfig), either f(top(<i); xNrfig) =
top(<i) or f(top(<i); xNrfig) <i f(xi; xNrfig) by weak unimodality (and totality) of
<i.
Hence, f(top(<i); xNrfig) <i f(xi; xNrfig) in any case. It follows that f is indeed
strategy-proof on DN .
Proof of Proposition 2. Let xN ; yN 2 XN , and f(xN) 6= f(yN). Then, by I-
monotonicity of f ,
f(xN) 2 I(xi; f(yi; xNrfig)) and f(yi; xNrfig) 2 I(yi; f(xN)) for each i 2 N .
Now, take i = 1. If f(xN) 6= f(y1; xNrf1g) then, thanks to Symmetry of I, Interval
Anti-Exchange applies, whence f(xN) 2 I(x1; y1), and the thesis immediately follows.
Let us then suppose that, on the contrary, f(xN) = f(y1; xNrf1g). Next, consider
f(y1; y2; xNrf1;2g).
By I-monotonicity of f , f(y1; xNrf1g) 2 I(x2; f(y1; y2; xNrf1;2g)) and f(y1; y2; xNrf1;2g) 2
I(y2; f(y1; xNrf1g)).
If f(xN) = f(y1; x2; xNrf1;2g) 6= f(y1; y2; xNrf1;2g) then again, by Interval Anti-
Exchange of I, it follows that f(xN) = f(y1; x2; xNrf1;2g) 2 I(x2; y2) as required by
the thesis. Thus, assume again that on the contrary f(xN) = f(y1; x2; xNrf1;2g) =
f(y1; y2; xNrf1;2g). A suitable iteration of the previous argument allows us to establish
that either f(xN) 2 I(xi; yi) for some i 2 f1; :::; n  1g or f(xN) = f(yNrfng; xn). In
the former case the thesis holds. In the latter case, by I-monotonicity of f , f(xN) =
f(yNrfng; xn) 2 I(xn; f(yN)) and f(yN) 2 I(yn; f(yNrfng; xn)). Since by hypothesis
f(xN) 6= f(yN) it follows, by Interval Anti-Exchange of I, that f(xN) = f(yNrfng; xn) 2
I(xn; yn) and the thesis is therefore established.
Proof of Theorem 1. Indeed, suppose that f is not coalitionally strategy-proof on
DN . Then, there exist S  N , (<i)i2N 2 DN , xN 2 XN and x0S 2 XS such that for
all i 2 S, top(<i) = xi and f(x0S; xNrS) i f(xN) (where idenotes the asymmetric
component of <i).
Notice that it may be assumed without loss of generality that S = N : to see this,
consider fxNrS : X
S ! X as dened by the rule fxNrS(yS) = f(yS; xNrS) for all yS 2
XS and observe that, by construction, fxNrS is both strategy-proof and not coalitionally
strategy-proof. Let us then posit f(xN) = f(xS) = u; and f(x0N) = f(x
0
S) = v: by
construction, v i u for all i 2 N . By Proposition 1 above, f is I-monotonic: therefore,
f(v; x0Nrf1g) 2 I(v; f(x0N)) = I(v; v), whence f(v; x0Nrf1g) = v, by idempotence of I.
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Similarly, by I-monotonicity of f again, f(v; v; x0Nrf1;2g) 2 I(v; f(v; x02; x0Nrf1;2g)) =
I(v; v): thus, by idempotence of I again,
f(v; v; x0Nrf1;2g) = v. A suitable iteration of the same argument establishes that
f(v; v; :::; v) = f(x0N) = v.
Now, suppose that there exists i 2 N , such that f(xN) = u 2 I(xi; v): since
xi = top(<i) and v i u by assumption, then <i =2 D because is not weakly uni-
modal with respect to I, a contradiction. Therefore, f(xN) =2 I(xi; v) for each i 2 N .
By Proposition 2 above it follows that f(xN) = f(v; :::; v) = f(x0N), a contradiction
again, whence the thesis is established.
Proof of Corollary 1.To begin with, notice that if jXj  3, then any interval space
(X; I) is convex: indeed, recall that in order to be not convex an interval space has
to include at least two points x; y and two points u; v such that fu; vg  I(x; y) but
I(u; v) * I(x; y) whence at least four points are needed. It is also immediately checked
that every antisymmetric interval space I = (X; I) with jXj  3 does satisfy Interval
Anti-Exchange: to see that, take X = fx; y; zg and assume that on the contrary there
exist a; b; c; d 2 X such that a 6= b, a 2 I(b; c), b 2 I(a; d), and a =2 I(c; d). Now,
a =2 I(c; d) implies a =2 fc; dg hence either c = d or c = b or else d = b. If c = d
then by antisymmetry a = b, a contradiction. If c = b then a 2 I(b; b) hence by
idempotence a = b, a contradiction again (recall that, as already observed above, an
antisymmetric interval space is also idempotent). Then, it must be the case that d = b
whence a 2 I(d; c) = I(c; d), a contradiction again. But then, Theorem 1 applies and
the proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 2. Indeed, suppose I does not satisfy MAE. Then, there exist
x; y; v; z 2 X such that x 6= y, v 6= z, x 2 I(y; v), y 2 I(x; z), v 2 I(x; z), z 2 I(y; v),
I(v; z) \ fx; yg = ? and I(y; z) \ fx; vg = ? (notice that by denition of I it follows
at once that jXj  4). But then, consider the following total preorder < on Y =
fx; y; v; zg:
<= f(v; z); (v; x); (v; y); (z; x); (z; y); (x; y); (y; x); (x; x); (y; y); (v; v); (z; z)g,
namely v  z  x  y.
Notice that we can assume without loss of generality that X = Y = fx; y; v; zg:
(otherwise, we might apply the following proof to subspace IY = (Y; IY ), to the same
e¤ect).
To begin with, observe that by construction weak I-unimodality of < only requires
that both x =2 I(v; z) and y =2 I(v; z). Thus, < is weakly I-unimodal.
Next, consider another total preorder <0on fx; y; v; zg:
<0= f(y; z); (y; x); (y; v); (z; x); (z; v); (x; v); (v; x); (x; x); (y; y); (v; v); (z; z)g,
namely y 0 z 0 x 0 v. Clearly, weak I-unimodality of <0 only requires that
x =2 I(y; z) and v =2 I(y; z). Thus, <0is also weakly I-unimodal.
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Then, consider the class of all voting rules f 0 : XN ! X such that for all u =uNrf1;2g 2
XNrf1;2g
f 0(v; y;u) = x, and f 0(z; z;u) = z.
Let us now show that there exists a voting rule f in that class which is I-monotonic.
To see that, observe that I-monotonicity of f amounts precisely to conditions (a)-(l)
as listed below: for all u 2 XNrf1;2g;
(a) f(x; x;u) 2 I(x; f(y; x;u)) \ I(x; f(v; x;u)) \ I(x; f(z; x;u))\
\I(x; f(x; y;u)) \ I(x; f(x; v;u)) \ I(x; f(x; z;u)) hence
positing f(x; x;u) = x is clearly consistent with (a);
(b) f(y; y;u) 2 I(y; f(x; y;u)) \ I(y; f(v; y;u)) \ I(y; f(z; y;u))\
\ I(y; f(y; x;u)) \ I(y; f(y; v;u)) \ I(y; f(z; y;u)) hence positing f(y; y;u) = y is
clearly consistent with (b) (and (a));
(c) f(v; v;u) 2 I(v; f(x; v;u)) \ I(v; f(y; v;u)) \ I(v; f(z; v;u))\
\ I(v; f(v; x;u)) \ I(v; f(y; v;u)) \ I(y; f(z; y;u)) hence positing f(v; v;u) = v is
similarly consistent with the whole of (a),(b) and (c);
(d) f(x; y;u) 2 I(x; f(y; y;u)) \ I(x; f(v; y;u)) \ I(x; f(z; y;u))\
\ I(y; f(x; x;u)) \ I(y; f(x; v;u)) \ I(y; f(x; z;u)) hence it must be the case that
f(x; y;u) = x since by construction I(x; f(v; y;u)) = I(x; x) = fxg (also notice that
since by construction x 2 I(y; v) that value is certainly consistent with the whole of
(a),(b),(c),(d) if ff(x; v;u); f(x; z;u)g  fx; vg: so let us assume the latter inclusion
as well);
(e) f(v; x;u) 2 I(v; f(x; x;u)) \ I(v; f(y; x;u)) \ I(v; f(z; x;u))\
\ I(x; f(v; y;u))\I(x; f(v; v;u))\I(x; f(v; z;u)) hence f(v; x;u) = x since I(x; f(v; y;u)) =
I(x; x) = fxg (notice that that value is certainly consistent with the whole of (a),(b),(c)(d),(e)
if
ff(y; x;u); f(z; x;u)g  fx; yg as well: then, let us also assume that inclusion);
(f) f(y; v;u) 2 I(y; f(x; v;u)) \ I(y; f(v; v;u)) \ I(y; f(z; v;u))\
\ I(v; f(y; x;u)) \ I(v; f(y; y;u)) \ I(v; f(y; z;u)) (notice that, therefore, positing
f(y; v;u) = f(x; v;u) = f(z; v;u) = v is consistent with (a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f) as intro-
duced above);
(g) f(y; z;u) 2 I(y; f(x; z;u)) \ I(y; f(v; z;u)) \ I(y; f(z; z;u))\
\ I(z; f(y; x;u))\I(z; f(y; y;u))\I(z; f(y; v;u)) hence, f(y; z;u) = z and f(x; z;u) =
v are jointly consistent with (a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f),(g) since by assumption z 2 I(y; v).
(h) f(v; z;u) 2 I(v; f(x; z;u)) \ I(v; f(y; z;u)) \ I(v; f(z; z;u))\
\ I(z; f(v; x;u)) \ I(z; f(v; y;u)) \ I(z; f(v; v;u)): observe that, since v 2 I(x; z),
f(v; z;u) = v is indeed consistent with (a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f),
(g),(h) as introduced above;
(i) f(z; y;u) 2 I(z; f(x; y;u)) \ I(z; f(y; y;u)) \ I(z; f(v; y;u))\
\ I(y; f(z; x;u)) \ I(y; f(z; v;u)) \ I(y; f(z; z;u)) hence f(z; y;u) = y is consistent
with (a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f),(g),(h),(i)
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since y 2 I(x; z) = I(z; f(x; y;u)) = I(z; f(v; y;u));
(l) f(z; v;u) 2 I(z; f(x; v;u)) \ I(z; f(y; v;u)) \ I(z; f(v; v;u))\
\ I(v; f(z; x;u))\ I(v; f(z; y;u))\ I(v; f(z; z;u)) hence in view of (e) f(z; v;u) = z
and f(z; x;u) = y are jointly consistent with (a),(b),(c),(d),(e),
(f),(g),(h),(i),(l) since z 2 I(y; v) = I(v; f(z; x;u)) = I(v; f(z; y;u));
Thus, we have just shown that there indeed exists a voting rule f that satises all of
the requirements (a)-(l) above, and is therefore I-monotonic, while at the same time
being such that for all u =uNrf1;2g 2 XNrf1;2g
f(v; y;u) = x, and f(z; z;u) = z.
Now, take any prole (<i)i2N 2 UNI of weakly I-unimodal total preorders on X such
that <1=<and <2=<0.
Then, by construction, top(<1) = v, top(<2) = y, z 1 x, z 2 x, f(v; y; (top(<i
)i2Nrf1;2g)) = x, and f(z; z; (top(<i)i2Nrf1;2g)) = z. It follows that f is not coalition-
ally strategy-proof, yet in view of Proposition 1 f is (individually) strategy-proof, a
statement that contradicts our general hypothesis.
Proof of Corollary 2. (i) It follows immediately from Theorem 1 and the proof of
point (vi) of the present Corollary as reported below;
(ii) Recall that for any graph G = (X;E), and any x; y; z 2 X, x 2 IG(y; z) if and
only if
dG(y; z) = dG(y; x) + dG(x; z).
Now, suppose that x 6= y, dG(y; z) = dG(y; x) + dG(x; z) and
dG(x; v) = dG(x; y) + dG(y; v).
Since x 2 IG(y; z) and y 2 IG(x; v), x lies on the unique path joining y and z, and y
lies on the unique path joining x and v. Hence there exists a path joining z rst to x,
then x to y, and nally y to v. Since G is a tree, that is in fact the unique path joining
z to v. Thus, by construction,
dG(z; v) = dG(z; x) + dG(x; v), and x 2 IG(z; v) i.e. Interval Anti-Exchange holds,
and the thesis follows immediately from Theorem 1.
(iii) Indeed, suppose that x 6= y, x 2 IG(y; z) and y 2 IG(x; v). Then, since G
is a clique, it follows that x = z and y = v. But then, IG(z; v) = IG(x; y) hence
clearly x 2 IG(z; v) and Interval Anti-Exchange holds. Therefore, the thesis follows
immediately from Theorem 1.
(iv) Let X = (X;6; 0; 1) be a bounded distributive lattice that is not a chain.
Thus, there exist x; y 2 X such that x 
 y and y 
 x. Hence, there also ex-
ist x ^ y =2 fx; yg, x _ y =2 fx; yg: clearly, by construction, x ^ y < x _ y. Now,
consider Y = fx; y; x ^ y; x _ yg, Im(a; b) with a; b 2 Y : indeed, by construction,
Im(x; y) \ Im(x ^ y; x _ y)  Y while Im(a; b) \ Y = fa; bg for any a; b 2 Y such
that fa; bg =2 ffx; yg ; fx ^ y; x _ ygg. Then, Im(x; y) \ fx ^ y; x _ yg = fx ^ y; x _ yg,
Im(x^y; x_y)\fx; yg = fx; yg, Im(y; x^y)\fx _ y; xg = Im(x; x^y)\fx _ y; yg = ?
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whence Minimal Anti-Exchange does not hold. Therefore, the thesis follows immedi-
ately from Theorem 2.
(v) It is well-known that Euclidean convex spaces do satisfy Interval Anti-Exchange
(see Coppel (1998)) . A direct proof of that claim is provided here just for the sake of
completeness. Let us then suppose without loss of generality that x 6= y, x 2 IE(y; v),
and y 2 IE(x; z) i.e. there exist real numbers 1; 2 2 (0; 1) such that x = 1y+(1 1)v
and y = 2x+(1 2)z (if f1; 2g\f0; 1g 6= ? the thesis follows immediately). Then,
x = 1(2x+ (1  2)z) + (1  1)v i.e.
x = 1(1 2)
1 12 z +
1 1
1 12v
where 1  1(1 2)
1 12  0, 1  1 11 12  0 and
1(1 2)
1 12 +
1 1
1 12 = 1 hence x 2 IE(v; z)
and Interval Anti-Exchange holds. Then, the thesis follows immediately from Theorem
1.
(vi) Let x 6= y, x 2 I(6)(y; v), y 2 I(6)(x; z). Hence, from x 6= y, x 2 I(6)(y; v)
it follows that either x = v, or y < x < v, or else v < x < y; moreover, from x 6= y,
y 2 I(6)(x; z) it follows that either y = z, or x < y < z, or else z < y < x. If x = v
or y = z then clearly x 2 I(6)(v; z), while neither (y < x < v and x < y < z) nor
(v < x < y and z < y < x) can possibly hold. If both y < x < v and z < y < x hold
then clearly z < y < x < v hence x 2 I(6)(v; z), and if both v < x < y and x < y < z
hold clearly v < x < y < z hence x 2 I(6)(v; z). Thus, in any case x 2 I(6)(v; z),
Interval Anti-Exchange holds, and the thesis follows immediately from Theorem 1.
(vii) It follows from the observation that a partial cube G = (X;E) which is not
a tree must include a squarefx; y; v; zg with IG(x; z) = IG(y; v)  fx; y; v; zg and
IG(a; b) \ fc; dg = ? for any a; b; c; d such that fa; b; c; dg = fx; y; v; zg and fa; bg =2
ffx; zg ; fy; vgg: to such a squarethe same argument provided in the proof of point
(iv) above applies, whence the thesis follows from Theorem 2.
(viii) First, let X = Y [ Z where Y denotes a chain and Z denote the vertex set of
a clique, G = (X;E) with E = ffu; vg : (u; v) 2 Y 2 [ Z2 or fu; vg = fy; zgg, z 2 Z
is the (unique) hubthat lies on any path connecting an arbitrary element of Y to
an arbitrary element of Z, and y is the unique element of Y which is adjacent to z.
Now, observe that by construction there is precisely one shortest path joining any two
vertices/outcomes (and z,y both lie on the path joining one vertex in Y to one vertex
in Z). Therefore the same argument previously used for trees under point (ii) applies,
Interval Anti-Exchange holds, and the thesis follows from Theorem 1.
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